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Within that Agreement the commitment to incorporation was only a part of a broader rights-related transitional package, which included the establishment of national human rights commissions, consideration of a Charter of Rights for the Island of Ireland, and consideration of a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland. 10 While some of these commitments have fallen by the wayside, 11 the incorporation commitment did not and so the 1998 Human Rights Act 1998 in the UK was followed by the introduced of the European Convention on Human Rights Act in Ireland (with significantly less fanfare) in 2003. The two Acts are not identical but they do have similar structures.
In each case there is an obligation on the Courts to ensure that statutes and other laws are interpreted in a manner consistent with each state's obligations under the Convention to the extent possible. 12 In each case there is also a performative obligation, requiring bodies undertaking state work to do so in a manner that is compatible with each state's Convention-based obligations. 13 Finally, where a statute cannot be interpreted in a manner that makes it Convention compatible, there is the possibility in both cases of court issuing a Declaration of Incompatibility.
14 The UK declaration is outlined in s.4 of the Human Rights Act. In respect of primary legislation, it provides that "If the court is satisfied that the provision is incompatible with a Convention right, it may make a declaration of that incompatibility". 15 Such a declaration does not impact on the validity of the impugned legislation and is not binding on the parties to the proceedings in which the declaration has been made. The UK Act uses the language of "public authorities" which can include private entities undertaking public work (so-called hybrid public authorities), whereas the Irish Act focuses instead on organs of the State. 14 Section 4, Human Rights Act 1998; section 5, European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003. 15 Section 4(2), Human Rights Act 1998. 16 Section 4(6), Human Rights Act 1998.
The Irish Declaration of Incompatibility is contained in s. 5 of the ECHR Act 2003, which provides in sub-section 1 that
In any proceedings, the High Court, or the Supreme Court when exercising its appellate jurisdiction, may, having regard to the provisions of section 2…and
where no other legal remedy is adequate and available, make a declaration…that a statutory provision or rule of law is incompatible with the State's obligations under the Convention provisions.
As in the UK, the Irish Declaration does not impact on the validity of the impugned legislation.
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In both jurisdictions, then, the Declaration of Incompatibility has a number of essential characteristics. The first is that the remedy is purely declaratory; it does not give rise to any entitlements (although in Ireland it does open up the possibility of an ex gratia payment 18 ) and it does not resolve the rights violation suffered by the litigant herself as the incompatible provision continues to operate upon her. This reflects the second characteristic: that a Declaration of Incompatibility leaves the impugned primary legislation operative and does not impact upon its validity. This has a number of important implications beyond the individual case at Bar: it means that the court does not resolve incompatibility with the Convention but merely identifies it, that any other potential litigants who are adversely impacted by the impugned legislation will have to go through with bringing and arguing their case to secure a Declaration of Incompatibility in relation to it (even though the incompatibility identified is systemic and may not be fact-specific), and that the broader and more systematic rights violation that the incompatibility may indicate remains unresolved. This is primarily because there is an underlying commitment within the Declaration of Incompatibility to political resolution of these broader, systemic difficulties of incompatibility, rather than their legal resolution. In both cases, the courts' role is simply to determine that an incompatibility with the Convention exists which cannot be resolved within the bounds of the court's interpretive capacities. After that, the political branches are seised with the role of deciding how-or even whether-to resolve the identified incompatibility. Thus, the Declaration of Incompatibility is designed to allow for a legal determination of the fact of incompatibility and a political determination of the desirability and, if appropriate, the mechanism of remedying that incompatibility. The Declaration does not create any legal obligation for such remedial action to be taken; rather it leaves the matter squarely in the hands of the political branches of state to be determined through contestation and debate.
This may seem alien within the Irish context of legally determinable, constitutionallyentrenched but it accords well with the constitutional context in which it was conceived, i.e. the UK constitution.
The Declaration of Incompatibility under the Human Rights Act 1998
The UK has what is conventionally termed a political constitution. The fact is that rather than be contested, most final Declarations of Incompatibility have been treated by Parliament as if they were binding upon them, 31 even to the extent of Home Secretaries sometimes claiming that they are compelled to change a law to be rights compliant even where they have no desire to do so. 32 Of course, as the previous section illustrates, that is an entirely inaccurate reading of the Declaration of Incompatibility as a legal matter; these Declarations are designed specifically not to be binding on Parliament. It may well be that the sorry saga of prisoner voting will be the turning point at which the contestability of rights under the Human Rights Act as illustrated by the Declaration of Incompatibility is accepted and embraced by the political branches. 33 Even if that does not happen, however, it remains the case that the design imperatives of the Declaration were to empower the courts from an adjudicatory perspective but balance that against the maintenance of political power relative to rights. In other words, it was designed to maintain the fundamentals of the constitutional structure; a structure that stands in sharp contrast to that which we find in Ireland.
The Irish Constitutional Culture of Rights
As already mentioned, the Constitution of Ireland includes a substantial section on fundamental rights. As well as those rights which are expressly enumerated in the This is not to suggest that there is no engagement between the judiciary and the political branches as regards rights. Rather, such an engagement happens in a number of ways. The first is that where rights-related questions have not been determined conclusively by judicial pronouncement the government will tend to be guided by its-or more accurately, its Attorney General's-best judgement as to whether anything is permitted or precluded by the Constitution. So, for example, the right to marry is clearly protected by the Constitution 34 but the Supreme Court has not settled through a direct adjudication whether the limitation of marriage to opposite sex couples is a violation of that constitutional right as enjoyed by those who are in same sex relationships and who wish to marry. The Attorney General's assessment (and that of her predecessor) is that the Constitution does not permit same sex marriage and, so, the government claims a constitutional barrier to introducing this measure.
Governments will not introduce law that they believe to be unconstitutional, or indeed that is clearly unconstitutional, not only because of the constitutional prohibition on doing so 35 but also because to do so would be perverse in the fact of the important presumption of constitutionality within Irish legal doctrine. This is the presumption that legislation as passed by the Oireachtas is consistent with the Constitution so that In Ireland then, unlike in political constitutional systems, the contestation that occurs in relation to the existence and content of a right takes place within clearly constrained pathways and the referendum is the primary political mechanism of such contestation.
Beyond that, constitutional rights as interpreted by the Supreme Court act as, and are rule of law by virtue of which buggery between persons is an offence is hereby abolished". This followed, with some delay, the Norris case but also a long campaign for decriminalisation on which see, for example. 48 In the wake of Airey an extremely limited system of free civil legal aid but attempts to extend the scheme by means of referring to the Convention were unsuccessful in E v E. 49 The extension was not secured until the Civil Legal Aid Act 1995, which followed a prolonged period of advocacy by, among others, FLAC.
50 44 It should be noted that where there is no legislation but rather a policy or a course of action that is being challenged, the Constitution does not necessarily allow for an ultimate resolution of the case. This is illustrated by the jurisprudence on children in detention, especially Rights Act 1998 (s. 3), namely the express inclusion of common law within the laws to be thus interpreted 57 and the articulation of a broader limitation clause on the interpretive duty ("subject to the rules of law relating to such interpretation and application"). 58 Leaving these differences to a side for the purposes of this paper, we can see that the starting point in both jurisdictions is to consider whether any impugned law can be interpreted in a Convention compliant manner and, if so, to ensure that it is thus interpreted. Secondly, the ECHR Act 2003 imposes an obligation on all organs of the state to "perform its functions in a manner compatible with the 
Conclusions
While it is clear that Declarations of Incompatibility will be rare in Ireland given their 'remedy of last resort' status, there is no question but that such Declarations are and will be issued. The question remains, however, whether they are at all worthwhile from the perspective of the litigant and, more importantly perhaps, of a culture of rights compliance. There does not seem to be any clear evidence to suggest that they speed up the process of bringing Irish law into greater compliance with the Convention, or even that they cause any kind of significant political difficulties for governments. Rather they are largely ignored with the political process outside of situations of advocacy and NGO engagement. It is difficult to identify with any kind of precision why this might be, but it seems at least arguable that it is attributable to the awkward fit of a Declaration of Incompatibility designed to instigate political contestation as to rights in a structure of constitutional supremacy in which rights-or at least 'rights that matter' from a political perspective-are legally determined and minimally contestable. In order for the Declaration of Incompatibility to be meaningful in the Irish context it is vital that it not be treated as a non-remedy.
Certainly, as outlined above, the Declaration of Incompatibility is a different kind of remedy to the rights-related remedies that are customary within the Irish legal system inasmuch as it is an essentially political remedy, however this need not rid it of its remedial capacities. Rather, these capacities might best be captured and capitalised on through some adjustments in both expectations and in structures.
As to expectations, litigants under the Act should be aware, and be made aware by Convention-compatibility as a general matter within the Oireachtas.
Declarations of Incompatibility in Ireland
As a remedy, the Declaration of Incompatibility is an admittedly awkward fit within 
